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Comments
Lay-Away Sales in Louisiana - - - Payment of the
Price as a Suspensive Condition to
Transfer of Ownership
While recent years have witnessed an increased use of the
"lay-away" plan of purchasing goods, little is to be found in cur-
rent jurisprudence or legal literature concerning such agree-
ments. It is hoped that this Comment will serve to show the
position such agreements should occupy in Louisiana sales law,
with emphasis upon the legal relations resulting between the
parties.'
1. The writer is indebted to Daniel J. McGee, member of the Mamou Bar, and
former Associate Editor of the Louisiana Law Review, for his recent survey of
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THE LAY-AWAY SALE
In general the conventional "lay-away sale" is an agreement
between the buyer and seller looking toward a transfer of owner-
ship in property. The parties usually agree as to some specific
thing, which is laid aside by the seller, until the buyer pays the
price. However, it sometimes happens that only a class of thing
is agreed upon, with no specific thing being appropriated until
the time of delivery. Because of the buyer's inability to pay the
full price in cash, the seller extends a period of credit, but re-
tains possession of the thing until the price is paid in full. Most
lay-away agreements provide for a fixed amount to be paid in
regular installments. It is sometimes provided that if the buyer
defaults in payment, the amount paid toward the price will be
forfeited, and the thing returned to stock for resale. It is the
custom of sellers, however, to give notice of default to the buyer
before such action is taken.
In the recent Louisiana case of Berry v. Ginsberg,2 the court
was presented with an arrangement closely akin to the lay-away
agreement. The buyer had agreed to purchase a diamond ring,
priced at $1830. Payment was to be by weekly installments, but
no fixed amount per installment or duration for payment was
prescribed. The seller was to retain possession of the ring until
the price was paid. After the buyer had paid $704 toward the
price of the ring, the seller refused to accept further payment,
contending that the weekly payments by the buyer were too
small. The court permitted recovery by the plaintiff-buyer for
the amount paid on the purchase price. In answering the defend-
ant-seller's reconventional demand for recovery of federal excise
taxes and certain property taxes paid,3 the court felt compelled
to decide the issue of transfer of ownership, and found that
ownership in the ring transferred at the time of the agreement.
the larger retail department stores throughout the state to determine the retail
merchants' attitude toward lay-away agreements. Material gathered through this
survey has made the writing of this Comment possible. Reference throughout to
practices, customs, and attitude of sellers in lay-away agreements are for the
most part taken from this material.
2. 98 So.2d 548 (La. App. 1957).
3. Any decision affecting transfer of ownership in lay-away agreements will of
necessity raise several tax questions, i.e., questions concerning federal income and
excise taxes, state sales and ad valorem taxes. It is not within the scope of this
Comment to consider the ramifications of these problems. It is interesting to note,
however, that Louisiana Sales Tax Regulations provide that "a sale whose deliv-
ery is conditional on payment of the price of the sale is not completed until the
amount due is received by the seller and therefore not taxable until the sale is
completed." Rules and Regulations Promulgated in Connection with Louisiana
General Sales Tax, tit. 47, §§ 301-318, as amended, art. 2-18 (1954).
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This was apparently considered as having resulted from the
parties' concurrence as to thing and price.4 The facts in this
case, with the exception that no fixed amount per installment
or duration for payment was prescribed, are substantially the
same as those in "lay-away sales." Whether the decision in the
Berry case should control in deciding when ownership transfers
in lay-away sales should depend upon whether the Berry case
was correctly decided under the principles of the Louisiana law
of Sales.
PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA SALES LAW
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, a sale is defined as an
agreement by which one gives a thing for a price in current
money, and the other gives the price in order to have the thing
itself.5 The sale is considered to be perfected between the par-
ties and the property is of right acquired by the purchaser with
regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for
the object and the price, although the object has not yet been de-
livered, nor the price paid.6 Thus the transfer of ownership is
accomplished by operation of law as soon as there is concurrence
as to thing, price, and consent. Civil Code Article 24577 provides,
however, that a sale may be made under a suspensive condition.
Such a sale, of which the condition forms a part is, like all other
contracts, complete by the assent of the parties.8 The agreement
may be said to constitute a sale subject to a suspensive condition,
if the transfer of ownership to some specific thing is involved.9
If at the time of the agreement the thing is not specifically
agreed upon, the agreement may be said to constitute a contract
4. While the reconventional demand was argued in the trial court, it was not
pressed on appeal. The court did not elaborate on the reason for its holding, but
apparently disposed of the issue only in passing, finding that any taxes paid by
the defendant because of the ring were paid in error, since ownership in the ring
had transferred to the buyer from the moment of the agreement. Berry v. Gins-
berg, 98 So.2d 548, 551 (La. App. 1957).
5. LA. CIVIL. CODE art. 2439 (1870).
6. Id. art. 2456.
7. "The sale may be made purely and simply, or under a condition either sus-
pensive or resolutive. . . . In all of these cases, its effects are regulated by the
principles laid down in the title: Of Conventional Obligations." See also id. arts.
2044, 2471.
8. Id. art. 2028.
9. Since the parties have reached agreement as to thing, price, and consent,
all of the essential elements of a sale are present; but the parties have by their
intention suspended the operation of its effect. The Code itself refers to such
agreements as sales subject to a suspensive condition. Id. art. 2460 (an agreement
with provision for view and trial is referred to as a sale "with a kind of suspensive
condition").
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to sell an indeterminate thing subject to a suspensive condition. 10
An example of such an agreement is the transaction in which the
seller agrees to sell and deliver to the buyer a certain quantity of
fungible goods, like so many sacks of rice, provided that the
good ship Peerless arrives by the end of the month. Although
the occurrence of the condition will not operate to work a trans-,
fer of ownership, it will render absolute the obligation to deliver
and to pay the price; but before ownership can pass it will yet
be necessary for the seller to appropriate to the contract the par-
ticular sacks of rice to be delivered thereunder. From the literal
language of Article 2457,1" it would appear that the parties may
agree to suspend all of the effects of a sale, that is, the seller's
obligation to deliver, the buyer's obligation to pay the price, as
well as the transfer of ownership, until the occurrence of some
designated event. There appears nothing elsewhere in the Code
which would preclude the parties from suspending all of these
effects together, or any one or more of them without at the same
time suspending any other. The Code itself specifically provides
that although the transfer of ownership has been effected, the
seller's obligation to deliver may be suspended until the buyer
pays the price.' 2 The Code also provides that both the transfer
of ownership and the buyer's obligation to pay the price may be
suspended until the seller has performed his obligation to de-
liver.13 However, no specific article of the Code declares that the
parties may suspend the transfer of ownership alone, while at
10. A determinate object is an essential element to a sale. As long as the ob-
ject bargained for remains indeterminate, the agreement is not a sale, but an
executory contract of sale (contract to sell). State v. Shields, 110 La. 547, 34 So.
673 (1903). Accord, George D. Witt Shoe Co. v. J. A. Seegars Co., 122 La. 145,
47 So. 444 (1908) ; Consolidated Cos. v. Laws, 124 So. 775 (La. App. 1929).
11. Quoted note 7 supra.
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2487 (1870) : "The seller is not bound to make a de-
livery of the thing, if the buyer does not pay the price, and the seller has not
granted him any time for the payment."
13. This is the relationship resulting between the parties in a sale subject to
view and trial. Id. art. 2460: "Things, of which the buyer reserves to himself the
view and trial, although the price be agreed on, are not sold, until the buyer be
satisfied with the trial, which is a kind of suspensive condition of the sale." (Em-
phasis added.) De la Vergne Co. v. New Orleans & Western R.R., 51 La. Ann.
1733, 26 So. 455 (1899) ; Jochams v. Ong, 45 La. Ann. 1289, 14 So. 247 (1893) ;
Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (1931). See
Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 85 (1929).
A provision for inspection of the goods by the buyer may accomplish this same
result. American Creosote Works v. Boland Machine & Mfg. Co., 213 La. 834, 35
So.2d 749 (1948) ; California Fruit Exchange v. John Meyer, Inc., 166 La. 9, 116
So. 575 (1928).
But not every provision for inspection by the buyer will suspend the transfer
of ownership. It must be clear that the parties contemplate a sale subject to a
suspensive condition. Brown-MeReynolds Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth Bond and
Casualty Co., 11 Orl. App. 49 (La. App. 1913).
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the same time being bound to deliver and to pay the price. While
the literal meaning of Article 2457 would seem to allow such an
arrangement, Louisiana jurisprudence has reached a contrary
result.14
PAYMENT OF PRICE AS SUSPENSIVE TO TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
French Authorities
According to the weight of French doctrinal authority the
parties may agree to suspend the transfer of ownership until the
price is paid, even though they have reached an agreement as to
thing and price.15 They proceed upon the premise that while the
Code provides for immediate transfer of ownership as soon as
there is agreement as to thing and price, this is not a matter of
public policy, and the parties are free to avoid this result by
manifesting an intention to do so. In such an agreement, the
transfer of property is made dependent on the happening of a
suspensive condition - payment of the price. The condition does
not destroy the obligatory effect of the contract itself, for the
buyer is bound to fulfill his contractual obligation to pay, and the
seller has the right to compel him to pay the entire price; only
the transfer of ownership is suspended.
Louisiana
The conclusion of the French authorities is predicated on
14. This is the result of the court's holding in the case of Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908). The effect
of this case on present Louisiana law will be discussed in detail in the development
of this Comment. See page 19 infra.
15. "De quelque mani~re qu'on explique ces textes, r'idde est claire. I1 V a trans-
fert immddiat de la propridtd, independant de tout fait ultdrieur.
"Mais ce principe n'est pas absolu. La yente, quoiqu'elle implique toujours et
ndcessairement l'idde du transfert, ne rdalise pas toujours par elle-meme ce trans-
fert ....
"Enfin, rien n'empdche les parties de s'entendre pour ajourner le transfert de la
propridt4 jusqu'd un moment ddtermin6 ou iusqu'd fait ultdrieur prdvu. 'artiteo
1583 ne pose pas un principe d'ordre public; done ren n'empdche qu'on V ddroge.
Par exemple, il east permis de conclure une yente suivant la mode romaine et do
convenir que la propridtd ne sera transfdrde a l'acheteur que quand il aura pay6
la prix. Le transfert de la propri~t6 est en quelque sorte subordonn6 A nne con-
dition suspensive." (Emphasis added.) The author adds in a footnote: "Mais la
condition ne s'applique pas au contrat Lui-mdme, car l'acheteur s'est engag6 ferme
4 remplir ses obligations, et le vendeur a le droit de le faire condamner & s'aquitter
intdgralement du prix." 11 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no, 14, 15
(1934). See also 5 AUBRY ET RAU ET EsMEIN, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 349,
n. 39 (1897-1922); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT, TRAIT] DE DROIT CIVIL
no 11 (1900) ; 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS no* 9, 10 (1952) ; 24
LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL no 4 (1876-1878). French decisions are in
accord. Civ. 1 juillet 1947 (2 arrets), S.1950.1.97, note Tirlemont; Req. 26 juin
1935, D.H. 1935.414; Gand, 28 juin 1893, D.1894.2.477; Req. 22 juillet 1872,
D.73.1.111, S.73.1.299.
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articles of the Code Civil,16 which are essentially identical with
those to be found in the Louisiana Civil Code.' 7 This being so,
there is no apparent reason why in Louisiana, in theory, the par-
ties might not effectively agree that transfer of ownership will
be suspended pending payment of the price. Applying this prin-
ciple to the lay-away agreement, there would appear no necessity
for concluding that ownership transfers to the buyer as of the
time the agreement is effectuated, even though the parties have
reached an agreement involving a concurrence as to thing and
price, if it is also their intention that ownership will not trans-
fer until the price is paid in full. A recent survey 8 in this re-
gard reveals that most sellers believe that they retain ownership
in the thing until the price is paid. As far as the buyer is con-
cerned, he may feel that he has a right to the delivery of the
thing, if the price is paid; but it would appear doubtful that he
considers himself clothed with complete ownership - at least
not to the extent of bearing the risk of the object's loss while it
remains in the seller's possession. Most buyers would probably
feel greatly alarmed over the possibility of having to pay the
price of the purchase, notwithstanding that the thing was de-
stroyed while it remained in the possession of the seller. From
the buyer-seller point of view it would thus appear that the par-
ties do not intend a transfer of ownership of lay-away items
while they are retained by the seller for security purposes. The
agreement appears to be one in which both parties are to be
bound, the one to pay the price, the other to deliver the thing;
but ownership in the thing is not to pass nor possession to be sur-
rendered until the price is paid.
The Barber Case
There would appear some question in Louisiana, nonetheless,
16. CODE CIVIL art. 1582: "La vente est une convention par laquelle l'un s'oblige
d livrer une chose, et l'autre d la payer.
"E/le pent dtre faite par acte authentique ou soUs seing priv6." Id. art. 1583:
"Eile est parfaite entre les parties, et la propridt eat acquise de droit d l'acheteur
a l'dgard du vendeur, dds qu'on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique la chose
n'ait pas encore 6 livrde ni le prio pay6." Id. art. 1584: "La vente peut dtre
faite purement et simplement, ou sous une condition 80it suspensive, soit rdsolu-
toire . . . . Dans tous ces cas, son effet est r6gl6 par les principes gdndrauo des
conventions."
17. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2439, 2456, 2457 (1870).
18. A questionnaire was recently addressed to many of the larger retail de-
partment stores throughout the state to determine the retail merchants' attitude
toward lay-away agreements. Of those answering the great majority indicated
that a particular item selected by the customer was the usual subject of "lay-away."
Most felt that the item agreed upon would belong to the purchaser only when he
had paid for it in full, and that during the "lay-away" the item would be covered
by their existing insurance policies.
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whether payment of the purchase price may thus serve to sus-
pend the transfer of ownership in an agreement looking toward
the transfer of movable property. This is the result of the case
of Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.,19 in which
the court was faced with an introduction into Louisiana law of
the common law conditional sale. 20 It was there said that "the
supposition that the payment of the price can be made a sus-
pensive condition, or condition precedent, to a sale, is an alto-
gether mistaken idea." 21 The court reasoned that if payment of
the price was such a suspensive condition, the agreement would
be binding on neither party. If the seller did not transfer owner-
ship in the thing, the buyer would be under no obligation to pay
the price, there being no consideration to support his promise.
The court further reasoned that to have a sale there must be a
price, and consequently since in this case the price had been
agreed upon and the buyer had contributed part payment there-
to, the parties had in effect reached an agreement involving con-
currence as to thing and price. In result, ownership transferred
to the buyer even though the parties had expressed a contrary
intention. The agreement was in fact a sale, that is, a transfer
of ownership, the two terms being treated as interchangeable.
The court's argument overlooks the fact that the parties should
be able validly to agree that one would pay the price and the
other would transfer ownership only when the price is paid, with
the result that, although the obligation of the parties are fixed
by the contract, the transfer of ownership will be suspended.
Under the Louisiana doctrine of consent, the parties' promise
alone should constitute a binding contract.2 2 In any event the
19. 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
20. Under such an agreement the buyer is given possession of the thing, while
the seller retains title until the price is paid. Bice v. Harold L. Arnold, Inc., 75
Cal. App. 629, 243 Pac. 468 (1925) ; Young v. Phillips, 203 Mich. 566, 169 N.W.
822 (1918). Cf. City of Boscobel v. Muscoda Mfg. Co., 175 Wis. 62, 183 N.W.
963 (1921).
21. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 166, 46
So. 193, 198 (1908).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1761 (1870) : "A contract is an agreement by which
one person obligates himself to another, to give, or to do or permit, or not to do
something, expressed or implied by such agreement."
Id. art. 1766: "No contract is complete without the consent of both parties. In
reciprocal contracts it must be expressed. In some unilateral contracts the law pro-
vides that under certain circumstances it shall be presumed."
Id. art. 1798: "As there must be two parties at least to every contract, so
there must be something proposed by one and accepted and agreed to by another to
form the matter of such contract; the will of both parties must unite on the same
point."
See generally, id. bk. III, tit. IV, c. 2, § 2, Of the Consent Necessary To Give
Validity to a Contract.
19581
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
seller's promise to transfer ownership and deliver should be
valid legal support for the buyer's promise to pay the price.28
While it may be true in Louisiana that transfer of ownership is
essential to a "sale," that is not to say that the parties are f or-
bidden to enter into a binding agreement looking toward the
transfer of ownership to occur when the buyer has fulfilled his
obligation to pay the price. As observed by the French, the code
provision stating that transfer of ownership is effectuated the
moment the parties have reached an agreement as to thing and
price is not predicated on a principle of public order from which
the parties cannot deviate. 24 There would appear nothing in the
Civil Code itself which would preclude the parties from suspend-
ing the transfer of ownership until the price is paid, if this in-
tention is properly manifested. Such an agreement would seem
to be, it is suggested, not a perfected sale, but rather a sale sub-
ject to a suspensive condition. 25 However, in those instances
where the object of the lay-away agreement is not specific and
the seller has agreed to deliver, when the price is paid, some-
thing identified only by description as one of a certain class or
kind, the agreement would properly appear to be called a contract
to sell subject to a suspensive condition. In such agreements the
buyer would be bound to pay the agreed price, and the seller
would be bound to select and deliver a thing of the kind called
for when the price has been paid.
The real reason underlying the decision in the Barber case
would appear to be a matter of policy. The court apparently was
concerned with the fact that the buyer was given possession of
the thing, although he was not to be the owner until the price
was paid. Such an arrangement would be detrimental to inno-
cent third parties dealing with the buyer who, though he had
possession, could not transfer ownership. For this reason the
court apparently found it necessary to call the transaction a sale,
with the resulting transfer of ownership, contrary to the inten-
tion of the parties. But the basic difference between the usual
lay-away sale and the attempted conditional sale of the Barber
case is that in the former possession is not given to the buyer
and there is no opportunity for third parties to be misled by the
appearance of ownership, derived from the fact of possession. To
23. See id. bk. III, tit. IV, c. 2, § 4, Of the Cause or Consideration of Con-
tracts. See also Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW RuvIEw
2 (1951).
24. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
25. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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hold, because of the reasoning of the Barber case, that ownership
in "lay-away sales" is transferred as of the time of the agree-
ment will serve but to accomplish what was there sought to be
avoided - possession in one party with ownership in the other.
This might work an undesirable hardship on the buyer, for not
only would it result in imposing on him the incidents of owner-
ship, such as risk of loss, but the buyer might stand to lose his
property in the goods if they should be sold by the seller while
they are in his possession.26 Policy considerations underlying the
Barber case being absent in "lay-away sales," there would appear
no necessity to conclude that ownership transfers to the buyer at
the time of agreement. The intention of the parties to suspend
transfer of ownership until the price is paid as long as the seller
retains possession should be effective. There being no immediate
transfer of ownership, the agreement may properly be called a
sale subject to a suspensive condition, or if the object agreed
upon is not specific, a contract to sell subject to a suspensive con-
dition, rather than a perfected sale.
Cash Sales
This same problem of whether payment of the purchase price
may be a suspensive condition to transfer of ownership is en-
countered in the use of the term "cash sale" in Louisiana. At
common law this is an agreement by which the transfer of own-
ership and possession is to take place concurrently, that is, only
upon payment of the price in cash. 27 An early Louisiana decision
took the position that transfer of ownership was not suspended
in a "cash sale" until payment of the price.28 However, in Clarke
Warehouse & Implement Co. v. Jacques & Edmond Weil,29 the
court reached an opposite result, holding that terms of payment,
usually mere accidental stipulations in contracts of sale, may as-
sume in particular agreements the importance of suspensive con-
26. As far as third persons are concerned, this is not important because as long
as the seller has possession he is in a position to transfer to a bona fide purchaser.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1922 (1870) : "If the vendor, being in possession, should, by
a second contract, transfer the ownership of the property to another person, who
gets the possession before the first obligee, the last transferee is considered as the
owner, provided the contract be made on his part bona fide, and without notice
of the former contract."
27. Winter v. Miller, 183 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1950) ; In re Liebig, 255 Fed.
458 (2d Cir. 1918) ; Koman v. Holtgreve, 207 Md. 151, 113 A.2d 419 (1955);
E. L. Welch Co. v. Lahart, 122 Minn. 432, 142 N.W. 828 (1913) ; Tri-County
Fin. Inc. v. Miller, 267 Wis. 174, 65 N.W.2d 39 (1954). See WILLISTON, SALES
§ 341 (Cash Sales - Meaning of the Term) (1948).
28. Hill v. Morgan, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 475 (La. 1826).
29. 152 La. 707, 94 So. 326 (1922).
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ditions, upon the happening of which alone the contract is to be
perfected and enforced. In Packard Florida Motors Co. v.
Malone3 0 the Supreme Court held that "complete title of owner-
ship does not pass to the purchaser at a cash sale until he has
paid the purchase price." Two more recent decisions3 1 further
indicate that ownership is suspended in a cash sale until the price
is paid. There it was reasoned that where parties have agreed
that payment is to be in cash, no time being allowed f or pay-
ment, and the seller accepts in lieu thereof a check or draft, the
transaction is converted into a credit sale.12 The sale is then com-
plete by reason of agreement as to thing and price, title passing
to the buyer. The logical implication of these decisions is that
no transfer of ownership is effected in a cash sale until the price
is paid, while in a credit sale title passes on mere agreement.
This can only be because the parties, though they have reached
an agreement as to thing and price, intend that the transfer of
ownership shall be suspended pending payment.
The lay-away plan of buying and selling is in many respects
similar to a cash sale. Under both arrangements it seems reason-
able to believe that the parties understand that transfer of own-
ership and surrender of possession are suspended until the price
is paid. The two are distinguished in the time allowed for pay-
ment - the cash sale requires an immediate payment of the en-
tire amount, while the "lay-away sale" provides for payment by
installment, but in each the seller is apparently seeking to retain
his ownership in the thing pending full payment of the price.
The court's attitude toward the suspension of transfer of owner-
ship in cash sales lends authority for a similar conclusion in lay-
away transactions.
Immovable Property
In this same regard, it is interesting to note that the Louisiana
court has experienced little difficulty in permitting the parties
to suspend transfer of ownership in contracts to sell immovable
30. 208 La. 1055, 1058, 1063, 24 So.2d 75, 77 (1945).
31. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957) ; Jeffrey Motor Co. v.
Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So.2d 369 (1956). Both of these decisions, as well as
Packard Florida Motors Co. v. Malone, 208 La. 1055, 24 So.2d 75 (1945), involved
agreements entered into outside of Louisiana. The court did not specifically in-
dicate that it was applying Louisiana law, but it did cite Louisiana Civil Code ar-
ticles as authority for its conclusion.
32. With regard to cash sales being converted into credit sales, Louisiana seems
to have adopted the minority view of the common law. See 31 A.L.R. 578 (1924),
Supplemented in 54 A.L.R. 526 (1928). But see WILLISTON, SALES § 346(a)
(1948), where the minority position is approved.
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* property, even though they have concurred as to thing and
price.88 The court seems to have established an irrefutable pre-
sumption that the parties intend only a contract to sell, especial-
ly Where they refer to a more formal act of sale to be passed
later.84 The policy underlying the decision in the Barber case is
not applicable when immovables are involved, since the code pro-
vision,85 that every sale of immovable property is null as to third
parties until it is recorded, protects third persons against injury.
This being so the parties remain free to postpone transfer of
ownership until the delivery of the final act of sale. This they
are held to intend, unless they manifest a contrary intention.8 6
The attitude of the court toward the transfer of ownership in the
sale of immovable property is further reflected in the decisions
dealing with public sales.3 7 Although the Civil Code itself pro-
vides that such sales are perfect at the moment of adjudication, 8
the court has reached a contrary result. Such sales will be' per-
fect at adjudication only if the price is paid. Thus if the sale
is for cash, transfer of ownership is suspended until the price is
paid ;9 if the sale is for credit, transfer is suspended until the in-
strument representing the indebtedness is delivered. 40 By their
decisions concerning private and public sales of immovable prop-
erty, the courts have actually eliminated the application of the
33. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940) ; Bandel v. Sabine
Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1940) ; McMillan v. Lorimer, 160 La. 400
107 So. 239 (1926) ; Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907) ; Peck v.
Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855) ; McDonald v. Aubert, 17 La. 448 (1841) ; Nbio
v. Blasco, 198 So. 429 (La. App. 1940) ; Succession of Premeaux, 17 La. App. 360
(1931).
By virtue of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2462 (1870), the parties have a right to
specific performance, and are not restricted to damages. Cerami v. Haas, 195 La.
1048, 197 So. 752 (1940) ; Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359
(1940) ; Nosacka v. McKenzie, 127 La. 1063, 54 So. 351 (1911) ; Lehman v. Rice,
118 La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907) ; Girault v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906).
See Comment, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 629 (1941).
34. Davis v. McCain, 171 La. 1011, 132 So. 758 (1931) ; Trichel v. Home Ins.
Co., 155 La. 459, 99 So. 403 (1924) ; Legier v. Braughn, 123 La. 463, 49 So. 22
(1909) ; Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906). In the Capo case no
title passed under a contract which provided that it was to certify "that I have
this day sold my house . . . to Thomas Capo . . . ten percent paid, balance when
act of sale is passed."
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2442 (1870).
36. See note 34 8supra.
37. For a thorough discussion of the public sale in Louisiana law, see Comment,
17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 197 (1956).
38. LA. CIvI CODE art. 2608 (1870).
39. In re Union Central Life Insurance Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So.2d 63 (1945);
Capital Building and Loan Ass'n v. Northern Insurance Co., 166 La. 179, 116 So.
843 (1928) ; First National Bank v. Coriel, 145 So. 393 (La. App. 193).
40. Mazoue v. Caze, 18 La. Ann. 31 (1866) ; Perkins v. Dickson, 1 Rob. 413
(La. 1842).
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rule of immediate transfer of ownership. 41 This is further indi-
cation that the rule that ownership transfers immediately, as
soon as the parties have concurred as to thing and price, is not
absolute. The court, when presented with agreements involving
transfer of immovable property, has itself deviated from it. If
it be said that decisions of this kind merely reflect the intentions
of the parties, it yet remains true that these intentions are con-
sidered controlling and that the only evidence thereof which is
required is the mention of a final act of sale to be passed at a
later date. Nothing should preclude the parties themselves from
doing likewise in the sale of movable property, if they manifest
such intention, at least where no danger to third parties is in-
volved, as in lay-away sales.
RISK OF Loss
If ownership does transfer in the "lay-away sale" as of the
time of agreement, the risk of loss is immediately shifted to the
buyer. 42 Presumably the parties may themselves expressly agree
to the contrary.43 If the parties do not so agree, the seller is still
obliged to guard the thing as a faithful administrator until it is
delivered to the buyer.4 4 This raises the question of the insurable
interest in the parties - whether the buyer or seller alone, or
whether both together possess such an interest. Most buyers do
not think to insure items while they are in lay-away.45 Many
could not afford to purchase such insurance. Sellers, on the other
hand, express the opinion that the thing while remaining in their
possession would be covered by their insurance. 46 This position
41. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2456 (1870): "The sale is considered to be perfect
-between the parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser with
regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the
price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid."
42. Id. art. 2467.
43. Kelham & Co. v. Carroll, Hoy & Co., 20 La. Ann. 111 (1868); Clark &
Thieneman v. Norwood, 19 La. Ann. 116 (1867) ; Goodwyn v. Pritchard, 10 La.
Ann. 249 (1855) (dictum).
44. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2468 (1870).
45. This attitude of the buyer is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code,
§ 2-509, Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach, Comment, para. 3 (1957):
"Whether the contract involves delivery at the seller's place of business or at the
situs of the goods, a merchant seller cannot transfer risk of loss and it remains
upon him until actual receipt by the buyer, even though full payment has been
made and the buyer has been notified that the goods are at his disposal . . . The
underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make physical delivery
at his own place continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to
insure his interest in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has no control of the
goods and it is extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance on goods not yet in
hia possession." (Emphasis added.)
46. See note 18 supra.
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would appear questionable, if ownership in the thing has already
transferred to the buyer, unless the seller's policy covers not only
his own interest in the thing sold, but the buyer's also. On the
contrary, if ownership does not transfer until the price is paid,
the thing, while remaining in the seller's possession, will be pro-
tected by a simple policy covering his interest alone.
REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Whether the lay-away agreement be called a perfected sale, or
a sale subject to a suspensive condition, or a contract to sell, own-
ership having transferred or not, the same judicial47 remedies
will be available to either party in the face of a breach. In case
of perfected sale, the Code itself provides for either specific per-
formance 48 or dissolution with damages, where such are appro-
priate.49 If the agreement is a sale subject to a suspensive condi-
tion, specific performance should be available as a remedy, since
the obligation of the seller is an obligation to give or deliver.50
It is sometimes provided in the lay-away agreement that upon
default by the buyer, the amount paid toward the purchase price
will be forfeited to the seller and the thing returned to stock for
resale. This provision, whether the agreement is a perfected sale
or not, should entitle the seller in a suit for dissolution to retain
the amount paid toward the purchase price as stipulated dam-
ages,5 ' unless the forfeiture would amount to an illegal award of
damages.5 2 In theory, the seller would not be privileged to resell
47. Whether the agreement is a perfected sale, or sale subject to a suspensive
condition, or contract to sell, it will have to be judicially dissolved or enforced.
See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2046, 2047, 2485, 2561 (1870). See Comment, 4 TUL. L.
REv. 92 (1929).
48. LA. CIVL CODE arts. 2485, 2551 (1870).
49. Id. arts. 2485, 2486, 2561, 2565.
50. Id. art. 1905: "The term to give . . . is applied only to corporeal objects,
that may be actually delivered from one to another; and it includes the payment
of money as well as the delivery of any other article." Of course the buyer's obliga-
tion to pay the price is specifically enforceable. The French authorities have
reached the same conclusion in reference to such agreements. See note 15 supra.
See also Note, 4 TUL. L. REv. 147 (1929).
51. Where the parties, by their contract, have determined the sum that shall be
paid as damages for its breach, the creditor must recover that sum, but is not en-
titled to more. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1934(5) (1870). Id. art. 1935: "The
damages due for delay in the performance of an obligation to pay money are called
interest. The creditor is entitled to these damages without proving any loss, and
whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover no more."
52. The court's attitude toward forfeiture provisions in bond for deed arrange-
ments should warrant such a conclusion. Where the object of a contract is any-
thing but the payment of money, the parties may determine the sum to be paid as
damages. But where the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the law has pro-
vided that no damages exceeding 8% per annum on the amount to be paid can be
stipulated. Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936) ; Heeb v. Codifer
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the thing without at least notifying the buyer of his intention
to do so.53 If the lay-away agreement is a perfected sale, resale
by the seller, before suit for dissolution, will be on an agency
basis or negotiorum gestio, since ownership in the thing has
transferred to the buyer.54 If ownership has not transferred, the
seller may resell in his own name, as he is still the owner. Of
course, if the seller should resell, without notice to the buyer or
suit for dissolution and the buyer be not at fault, he may subject
himself to damages for breach of contract.55 Innocent third
& Bonnabel, 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Griffin v. His Creditors, 6 Rob.
216 (La. 1843).
It is interesting to note recent developments in the common law concerning for-
feiture of payment where the buyer is in default. "The position of the defaulting
buyer of goods is now in the process of change. Although there are still decisions
following the common-law rule forfeiting all of the buyer's executed performance,
the last quarter century reveals a modified view. The impetus for this change
originated with Corbin's article in 1931 [Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee
to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931)], suggesting
that a defaulting vendee should be allowed restitution of installments paid ...
This unjustified distinction [between the restitution rights of defaulting seller and
buyer] has created a severe hardship upon the buyer in recent years with the in-
creased use of the 'lay-away' plan of purchasing goods. Exemplifying the harsh-
ness of the strict forfeiture rule is the recent case of Bisner v. Mantell (197 Misc.
807, 92 N.Y.S.2d 825 (City Ct. 1949), aff'd, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (City Ct. 1950))
where the purchaser of furniture on the 'lay-away' plan forfeited payments amount-
ing to fifty percent of the purchase price, the court commenting that 'it was en-
tirely immaterial whether the defendant suffered actual damages or not.' The
harshness of such decisions and the increasing use of the so-called lay-away plan
were suggested by the 1952 New York Law Revision Commission as grounds for
legislative change in the law of New York (N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n, 1952 Leg.
Doe. No. 65(c), p. 5). Maryland enacted a statute in 1941 protecting the buyer
in installment sales provided the default occurs before the seller is obligated to
deliver the goods sold. (Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 83, sec. 121 (1951))."
(Footnotes have been added to the quote where cited by the author.) Corman,
Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Sales Contracts, 34
TEXAS L. REV. 582, 595, 598 (1956).
53. "The rule of law is that, when a vendee refuses to accept delivery of the
goods and pay the price, the vendor, after reasonable notice to vendee, may sell the
goods to best advantage, at auction or at private sale, and hold the vendee for the
difference in price." H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 308, 88 So. 916,
917 (1921) ; Searcy v. Gulf Motor Co., 37 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1948) (seller
should give express and unequivocal notice putting the vendee in default and setting
forth an intention to resell the article). See Comment, 23 TUL. L. REV. 559
(1949).
54. The right of resale, even though ownership has transferred to the buyer,
has (without much direct code authority) entered Louisiana law of sales. Hender-
son v. United States Sheet and Window Glass Co., 168 La. 66, 121 So. 576 (1929) ;
Mutual Rice Co. v. Star Bottling Works, 163 La. 159, 111 So. 661 (1927) ; H. T.
Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921) ; Judd Linseed and
Sperm Oil Co. v. Kearney, 14 La. Ann. 352 (1859); Gilly v. Henry, 8 Mart.
(O.S.) 402 (La. 1820) ; Leon Godchaux Clothing Co. v. DeBuys, 120 So. 539 (La.
App. 1929) (if the vendee refuses to accept delivery, the vendor becomes the
negotiorum gestor of the vendee, and must administer the thing sold like a good
administrator). See Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 92 (1929).
55. "A contract may be violated, either actively by doing something inconsistent
with the obligation it has proposed or passively by not doing what was covenanted
to be done, or not doing it at the time, or in the manner stipulated or implied
from the nature of the contract." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1931 (1870).
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parties buying from the seller will be protected in a claim by the
buyer, whether the agreement is a perfected sale or not, since
the seller has retained possession. 56 It is evident from the above
analysis that both buyer and seller in the lay-away agreement
will be amply protected against a breach of obligation by the
other.
CONCLUSION
Several Louisiana cases would seem to furnish authority for
holding that ownership might transfer in "lay-away sales" as of
the time of agreement as to thing, price, and consent. Such does
not appear, however, to be consonant with the probable intention
of the parties. Nor is such a conclusion necessitated by the pres-
ent Louisiana Code system. Payment of the purchase price
should serve as a suspensive condition to the transfer of owner-
ship, if the parties so intend, at least where the seller retains
possession. The court's attitude toward the cash sale and con-
tracts to sell immovable property supports this position. If own-
ership is not suspended in the lay-away agreement, risk of loss
will be shifted to the buyer, although the seller retains possession
and is in a better position to protect himself by a regular insur-
ance policy. As regards remedies available, both buyer and seller
will be amply protected in the face of a breach, whether owner-
ship has transferred immediately or not. In the final analysis
the lay-away plan of purchasing goods is but a modern security
device, serving the needs of contemporary credit buying. As in
any contractual arrangement, absent contrary public policy, the
intention of the parties should be controlling.
Stephen J. Ledet, Jr.
A Comparison of Redhibition in Louisiana
And the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code,1 which has now been adopted
in three states, 2 attempts to cover the entire field of commercial
56. Id. art. 1922.
1. All references in this Comment to the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter
abbreviated UCC) are to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
COMMENTS (1957).
2. Ky. Law 1958, c. 77; MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 106 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A (1954).
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